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of the Yakima Nation
Robert W. McGee*
In 1987, Yakima County, Washington, initiated foreclosure
proceedings on properties belonging to the Yakima Indian
Nation and its members. The county's foreclosure was precipi-
tated by the property owners' failure to pay past due ad
valorem and excise taxes. Despite vigorous arguments by the
Yakima Nation, the United States, and the thirty-one Yakima
Indian families likely to be rendered homeless by an adverse
decision, the United States Supreme Court held in County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Nation,' that states have the power to impose ad valorem taxes
on reservation land owned in fee by Indians.2 This Recent
Development provides a brief summary of that decision.
The Yakima Indian Reservation consists of about 1.3 mil-
lion acres and is located in southeastern Washington. The
United States holds eighty percent of the land in trust for the
benefit of the Tribe or its individual members, and the other
twenty percent is owned in fee by either the Tribe, individual
members, or non-Indians. Virtually all of the reservation is
within Yakima County.4
Yakima County imposes ad valorem taxes on real estate
* This Recent Development was submitted by Robert W. McGee, an Associate
Professor at the W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University.
1. 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
2. Id. at 694. The Court also held, however, that the states may not impose an
excise tax on the sale of such lands. Id.
3. Id. at 687. Non-Indian ownership arose as a result of the rights that were
distributed during the allotment era. See id. (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 415 (1989)).
4. Id.
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and excise taxes on the sale of real estate.5 It has imposed and
collected these taxes on the Reservation's fee lands without
incident for decades. This changed in 1987, when Yakima
County initiated foreclosure proceedings against parties who
had not paid their ad valorem or excise taxes. These attempts
at collection caused the Yakima Nation to file suit for declara-
tory and injunctive relief. The Tribe claimed that federal law
prohibited the imposition or collection of these taxes on fee-
patented lands that were held either by the Tribe or its
members.7
The District Court awarded the Tribe summary judgment
and prohibited Yakima County from imposing or collecting
taxes on fee-patented lands.' The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that an excise tax could not be imposed; how-
ever, it held that an ad valorem tax would be impermissible
only if it would have a "'demonstrably serious' " impact on the
" 'political integrity, economic security, or the health and wel-
fare of the tribe.' "9 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
the District Court for such a determination. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the tax was
proper.'0
Previously, the Supreme Court has held that states do not
have the power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indi-
ans absent cession of jurisdiction or a federal statute that
would permit taxation." The Court has also historically with-
held recognition of Congressional authorization to allow state
taxation unless the intent of Congress is unmistakably clear. 2
In light of these holdings, Yakima County argued that Section
5. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.45.070, 84.52.030 (1989). An ad valorem tax is a tax that
is assessed according to value. In the case of an ad valorem property tax, it is assessed
with regard to the property's value. An excise tax is a tax assessed on the
manufacture, sale, or consumption of certain commodities such as liquor, tobacco, and
gasoline. Excise taxes are generally assessed on commodities that have inelastic
demand curves, which means that the people who buy the product will tend not to
reduce usage much if the tax causes the price to increase.
6. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 687.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 903
F.2d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431), affd, 112 S. Ct. 683
(1992).
10. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 687.
11. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
12. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985); see also California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (1987).
County of Yakima v. Yakima Nation
6 of the General Allotment Act 13 provided the county with
express authority to tax the fee-patented lands.14 Section 6 of
the Act provides:
At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands
have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee.... then
each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be sub-
ject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Terri-
tory in which they may reside .... Provided, That the
Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is
authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian
allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her
affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such allottee a
patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale,
incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed.'5
In accepting Yakima County's argument, the Supreme
Court cited to the Burke Act of 190616 as providing congres-
sional authorization for the state taxation of Indian lands. 7 In
particular, the Court stated that, through the Burke Act, Con-
gress manifested its intent to permit state taxation by "specifi-
cally mentioning immunity from land taxation 'as one of the
restrictions that would be removed upon conveyance in fee'"
of Indian lands. 8
The Yakima Nation contended, however, that, with
respect to an Indian reservation, Section 6 was "a dead let-
ter."' 9 Specifically, the Yakima Nation argued that Congress
repealed Section 6 when it terminated the allotment program
and restored tribal sovereignty through the Indian Reorganiza-
13. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 336, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349 (1989)). This Act, also known as the
Dawes Act, gave the President authority to allot most tribal lands without first
obtaining the consent of affected Indian nations. In order to prevent the quick sale or
encumbrancing of the allotted land, the Act provided that each parcel would be held in
trust by the United States for 25 years or more. After this period expired, a fee patent
could be issued to the Indian allottee. See Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 686.
14. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 688.
15. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1989).
16. Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182. ThisAct gave the President the
option of issuing a patent in fee simple before the expiation of the relevant trust
period if the allottee was found to be competent and capable of managing his own
affairs. Id. at 182. This proviso also removed all restrictions on the sale,
encumbrance, or taxation of the land. Id. at 183. See Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 686,
688.
17. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 688.
18. Id. (quoting Yakima Nation, 903 F.2d at 1211).
19. Id. at 688-89.
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tion Act of 1934.20
In support, the Tribe cited a number of subsequent con-
gressional actions,2 ' in addition to a Supreme Court case, Moe
v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes.22 The Yakima
Nation argued that Moe repudiated the Allotment Act's contin-
uing jurisdiction.23 In Moe, the State of Montana tried to
impose cigarette sales taxes, personal property taxes, and ven-
dor licensing fees on the Indian residents of a reservation that
was located entirely within the state. Montana based its juris-
diction on Section 6 of the General Allotment Act. Montana
did not, however, limit its claimed tax authority to either the
allottees on the reservation or to activities occurring on allot-
ted reservation fee land. Rather, Montana claimed taxing
authority over the entire reservation, including trust land, and
argued that any plan of divided jurisdiction was inequitable.24
The Supreme Court rejected Montana's claim of reservation-
wide jurisdiction. Instead, the Court reasoned that because
Congress repudiated, through the Indian Reorganization Act,
the policies underlying the General Allotment Act, the latter
Act did not even grant Montana plenary jurisdiction over the
Indians residing on reservation fee lands. 25 The Moe Court
stated:
The State has referred us to no decisional authority--and we
know of none---giving the meaning for which it contends to
§ 6 of the General Allotment Act in the face of the many
and complex intervening jurisdictional statutes directed at
the reach of state law within reservation lands .... Congress
by its more modern legislation has evinced a clear intent to
eschew any such 'checkerboard' approach within an existing
Indian reservation, and our cases have in turn followed Con-
gress' lead in this area.26
20. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1989)). This Act brought the
allotment policy to an abrupt halt by eliminating the Secretary of the Interior's power
to issue a fee patent prior to the end of the 25-year trust period. Id. Significantly, this
Act represented a return to the pre-Dawes Act era policy of Indian self-determination
and sovereignty. See Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 686-87, 688-89.
21. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 689.
22. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
23. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 689.
24. Id.
25. Moe, 425 U.S. at 479.
26. Id. In Yakima Nation, the Court points out the curious argument of the Tribe,
which apparently condemns a checkerboard approach (by which the tax assessor
would have to make parcel-by-parcel determinations of taxability), while advocating a
checkerboard solution of its own. In particular, the Tribe advocated an approach
County of Yakima v. Yakima Nation
Thus, the Yakima Nation argued that if, under Moe, Sec-
tion 6 no longer gives states plenary jurisdiction over the reser-
vation fee land owners, then Section 6 could not support the
exercise of the narrower jurisdiction asserted by Yakima
County.27 Yakima County conceded that the Moe Court did
not address the Burke Act proviso to Section 6, which was crit-
ical to Yakima County's analysis. But the Yakima Nation nev-
ertheless argued that real estate taxes were not at issue in
Moe, thereby makiig the proviso irrelevant.8 The Yakima
Nation reasoned that because a proviso can operate only within
the principal provision it modifies,29 "neither the language of
§ 6 proper nor the proviso can be considered effective after
Moe.
, 30
The Supreme Court reasoned, in turn, that the Yakima
Nation misunderstood Moe and the General Allotment Act's
structure.31 In particular, the Court pointed out that Moe had
not impliedly repealed Section 6, relying on the "cardinal rule
... that repeals by implication are not favored" and the fact
that the Moe Court made no mention of an implied repeal.32
The Court then distinguished Moe on the basis that, in that
case, "Montana's construction of § 6 . . . would [have]
extend[ed] the State's in personam jurisdiction beyond the sec-
"133tion's literal coverage ....
As for the structure of the General Allotment Act, the
Court cited Goudy v. Meath34 for the proposition that Congress
had authorized, under the Act, the taxation of fee-patented
land.3 5 This holding, the Court indicated, was confirmed when
Congress added the Burke Act proviso, which explicitly
removed all restrictions on taxation once an allottee received a
portion of land in fee simple.36
Finally, in holding that Congress explicitly authorized the
whereby the state could only tax parcels owned by nonmembers of the Tribe. Yakima
Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 690.
27. Yakima Nation, 425 U.S. at 690.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing United States v. Morrow, 266 U.S. 531 (1925)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 690 (quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296
U.S. 497 (1936)).
33. Id.
34. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
35. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 690-91.
36. Id. at 691.
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state taxation of Indian lands, the Court rejected the Yakima
Nation's claim to self-governance under the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act. The Court stated as follows:
Turning away from the statutory texts altogether, the
Yakima Nation argues that state jurisdiction over reserva-
tion fee land is manifestly inconsistent with the policies of
Indian self-determination and self-governance that lay
behind the Indian Reorganization Act and subsequent con-
gressional enactments. This seems to us a great exaggera-
tion. While the in personam jurisdiction over reservation
Indians at issue in Moe would have been significantly disrup-
tive of tribal self-government, the mere power to assess and
collect a tax on certain real estate is not. In any case, these
policy objections do not belong in this forum. If the Yakima
Indian Nation believes that the objectives of the Indian
Reorganization Act are too much obstructed by the clearly
retained remnant of an earlier policy, it must make that
argument to Congress.37
Having thus held, the Court then distinguished the two
separate taxes sought to be imposed by Yakima County as fol-
lows: (1) under an ad valorem tax, the owner is liable on the
assessment date' and the tax is assessed against the land39 and
(2) under an excise tax, the seller is taxed on the sale4" and the
tax is assessed against the person involved in the transaction.41
Thus, because the ad valorem tax is a burden only on the prop-
erty itself, the Court held that "this tax constitutes 'taxation of
. . . land' within the meaning of the Allotment Act, and is
therefore prima facie valid."'  The Court then held, however,
that while states have the power to tax land, "the excise tax
remains a tax upon the Indian's activity of selling the land, and
thus is void, whatever means may be devised for its
collection. 43
Writing separately, Justice Blackmun agreed with the
majority opinion that Yakima County could not impose an
excise tax on the sale of Indian land. Justice Blackmun dis-
sented, however, to the extent that the County could impose
37. Id. at 692.
38. Timber Traders, Inc. v. Johnston, 87 Wash. 2d 42, 47, 548 P.2d 1080, 1083 (1976).
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.60.020 (1989).
40. Id. § 82.45.080.
41. Mahler v. Tremper, 40 Wash. 2d 405, 409, 243 P.2d 627, 629 (1952).
42. Yakima Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 692.
43. Id. at 694.
County of Yakima v. Yakima Nation
an ad valorem tax.44 In his view, it was not "unmistakably
clear" that Congress intended to allow the states to tax Indian-
owned fee-patented land.45 Rather, Justice Blackmun believed
that the majority had merely implied congressional intent and,
in doing so, had "dramatically devalue[d] longstanding federal
policies intended to preserve the integrity of our Nation's
Indian tribes.
46
Specifically, according to Justice Blackmun, the majority
made three related errors in arriving at its decision.47 First,
the majority mistakenly relied on the Burke Act proviso-a
proviso that speaks to an obsolete clause of Section 6 of the
Dawes Act.48 Second, the majority acted on its own intuition
that it would be "strange" for land that was alienable and
encumberable not to be taxable.49 Third, the majority failed to
give effect to the intervening statutes that reflect a complete
turnaround in federal Indian policy, which is now aimed at
preserving tribal sovereignty and the Indian land base.'
Thus, in speaking to the effect of the Court's decision, Jus-
tice Blackmun opined that the majority had erroneously
focused its inquiry on whether the Dawes and Burke Acts had
been repealed, instead of whether Congress had pre-empted
state law. In particular, Justice Blackmun stated that the state
taxation of Indian lands cannot be reconciled with the princi-
ples of tribal integrity and self-determination underlying the
Indian Reorganization Act.
44. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring & dissenting).
45. Id. Justice Blackmun stated: "I have wandered the maze of Indian statutes
and case law tracing back 100 years. Unlike the Court, however, I am unable to find
an unmistakably clear intent of Congress to allow the states to tax Indian-owned fee-
patented lands." Id.
46. Id. at 694.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 695.
49. Id. at 695-96.
50. Id. at 696.
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